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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of externalities from education 
in Sweden in an earnings equation framework. The empirical models are esti-
mated on a large sample of matched employees and establishments. External 
effects of education are identified from the average educational attainment of 
workers outside the individual’s establishment. The paper also investigates the 
coherence of the evidence with respect to the idea that educational externalities 
arise through face-to-face interaction between individuals. A set of different 
specifications and fixed effects models is used to investigate the robustness of 
the basic cross-sectional model. The cross-sectional models suggest, in general, 
that externalities are positive and significantly different from zero. The cross-
sectional evidence is also broadly coherent with the idea that externalities are 
declining in spatial transaction costs, such as the Euclidean distance between 
establishments. However, after accounting for individual fixed effects and 
dummy variables for the county in which the individual works the results indi-
cate no statistically significant external effects of education on earnings in 
Sweden.  
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1. Introduction 
The idea that localized human capital externalities may have positive effects on 
economic growth seems to have gained widespread attention among econo-
mists in recent years. It has also been hypothesized that such beneficial effects 
of human capital are likely to operate more efficiently in dense economic envi-
ronments such as cities (see for example Lucas, 1988, and Jacobs, 1969). The 
motivation is that face-to-face interaction between individuals is likely to be 
more frequent in geographical areas with high population or employment den-
sity and that it is easier to find the “right” individuals to interact with in such 
areas. Such interactions may, in turn, be an important channel through which 
new ideas and knowledge are transmitted in the economy. There are different 
theoretical formalizations of such ideas (see Duranton & Puga, 2004, for a re-
cent survey of theoretical work in this field). The idea seems, however, to date 
back at least to Marshall (1920).  
As with all kinds of externalities, the issue of human capital externalities is 
obviously policy relevant. It relates to the question if, and by how much, educa-
tion should be subsidized. In light of this relevance, it is somewhat surprising 
to note that empirical work on this issue has been relatively scant, at least rela-
tive to the large literature on private economic returns to human capital.
1 This 
paucity of empirical work might partly be due to the fact that “[k]nowledge 
flows ... are invisible; they leave no paper trail by which they may be measured 
and tracked...”, as Krugman (1991b, p 53) puts it.
2 In other words, human capi-
tal externalities are hard to observe in data so it may be difficult to model them 
empirically. 
One feasible empirical approach is based on wage equations. In a pioneering 
paper Rauch (1993) demonstrates that conditional on own educational attain-
ment, the wage of an individual is also positively related to the average educa-
tional level in the metropolitan area in which he/she lives.
3 Thus, even though 
human capital externalities “leave no paper trail”, Rauch’s framework may be 
useful to measure, at least indirectly, human capital externalities.
4  
                                                      
1  See Moretti (2004a) for a survey of empirical research on human capital externalities. 
2 However, Jaffe et al (1993) argue convincingly that knowledge flows sometimes do leave a pa-
per trail in the form of patent citations. 
3 Rauch (1993) also demonstrates that housing costs are increasing in the average educational 
level of a metropolitan area’s workforce. 
4 A related approach is based on so-called Macro-Mincer equations, which are employed for 
cross-country comparisons of gross national incomes rather than data on individuals living in dif-
ferent geographical regions (see,  for example, Krueger & Lindahl,  2001). IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   4 
There are some potential drawbacks of the model used by Rauch, however. 
The first is that he treats the average educational attainment as an exogenous 
variable in the wage equation. There is, however, a risk that causation also runs 
from high wages to high educational attainment, and that relevant variables 
have been omitted from the regression equation. Thus, it is not surprising that 
many of the papers following Rauch have focused on the possible endogeneity 
of the average level of schooling. Acemoglu & Angrist (2000), Moretti 
(2004b), and Ciccone & Peri (2004) all use some kind of instrumental variable 
approach to account for this potential problem of the analysis. Chosen instru-
ments are, for example, the time-lagged age-structure in the geographical unit 
of observation and time-lagged differences in schooling legislation between 
different geographical units of observations. The results of these papers are 
mixed. Some report statistically significant external returns whereas others re-
port no statistically significant results.  
A second drawback of Rauch’s model, noted by Ciccone & Peri (2004) and 
Moretti (2004b) is that a positive association between the wage of an individual 
and the average educational attainment in his/her labor market may also be due 
to imperfect substitutability between workers with different educational levels. 
In a conventional demand-supply framework, an increase in the share of highly 
educated workers in a labor market will lower the wage of such workers (in the 
absence of positive human capital externalities) but raise the wage of lower 
educated workers when the two types of workers are complements in produc-
tion. Thus, the net effect on the average wage may be positive even in the ab-
sence of human capital externalities.
5 After controlling for imperfect substitut-
                                                      
5 Ciccone & Peri (2004) propose an empirical approach that allows the identification of human 
capital externalities even when workers with different levels of educational attainment are imper-
fect substitutes in production. The approach is based on the observation that an increase in aver-
age human capital of the work-force has no first-order effects on the average wage in a geo-
graphical area when wages reflect marginal social products, and the skill-composition of the 
work-force in the geographical area is held constant. But the increase will have a first-order ef-
fect whenever wages of high-skilled workers are below the corresponding marginal social prod-
uct, and the skill-composition is held constant. Hence, Cicconce & Peri suggest that the external 
effects of education on wages is identified through the change in average educational attainment 
between different points in time in a geographical area, holding the weights of the skill-
composition in the geographical area constant. Based on this constant-composition approach they 
find no significant effects of aggregate human capital on wages. Moretti (2004b), on the other 
hand, argues that if an increase in the share of college educated workers in a city increases the 
wages of such workers, the effect of human capital externalities may be strong enough to domi-
nate the negative supply-effect on wages. His results suggest that the positive external effects to 
education are indeed significantly different from zero. However, this evidence is also in line with 
an explanation relying on skill-biased technological change, where technical change may have a 
positive effect on wages of high-skilled workers which is large enough to dominate negative ef-
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ability in the estimation framework Ciccone & Peri find no statistically signifi-
cant results of external returns to education. 
 One restriction of most previous work on external returns to education is 
that the geographical scope of externalities is dictated by the chosen geographi-
cal unit in the analysis. In general, it is assumed that externalities come to a halt 
at the administrative borders of the geographical unit, and that they are homo-
geneous within the geographical unit. In other words, distance and transport 
costs between individuals or production plants are not explicitly modeled. Such 
costs may obviously be relevant if face-to-face interactions are thought to be 
important for the transmission of new ideas, skills and knowledge. An excep-
tion is a recent investigation by Conley et al (2003) who let externalities de-
pend on the geographical distance between individuals. They find that the ex-
ternal effects are indeed larger for individuals that are located close to each 
other.
6 The explicit modeling of transport costs may, in addition, also be rele-
vant from a policy perspective, since one major cost regarding the potential 
face-to-face interaction between individuals is the cost of transporting people 
(cf Glaeser & Kohlhase, 2004).
7 
The purpose of the present paper is to estimate human capital externalities 
in an earnings equation framework using data from Sweden. The analyses are 
based on a large longitudinal sample of matched employees and establishments 
with detailed information on the educational attainment of the work-force at the 
establishment level. The analyses also use information on all establishments in 
Sweden, so that the educational attainment of the workforce in the local labor 
markets may be described in a relevant way. To investigate whether individu-
als’ face-to-face interaction are important in this framework, the analyses also 
add a spatial structure to the empirical models. Geographical coordinates (lon-
                                                                                                                                 
fects on wages of an increased supply of high-skilled workers (see Berman, et al, 1994, for an in-
vestigation on US data, or Mellander, 1999, for an investigation on Swedish data).  
6 Using another metric for distance, Moretti (2004c) tests the coherence of the evidence in a simi-
lar spirit by investigating whether the magnitude of estimated externalities depends on the eco-
nomic distance between plants. By using input-output tables to measure the degree of interaction 
between plants, he finds that educational externalities, or spillovers, are larger for plants that of-
ten interact and smaller for plants with relatively little interaction with each other. 
7 The increased use of information technology in the last decade has lowered the cost of contact-
ing people; e g through electronic mail and the internet. This might suggest that the cost of trans-
porting people would tend to lose some of the policy relevance related to facilitating face-to-face 
interaction. However, Gaspar & Glaeser (1998) note that this reasoning hinges on the assumption 
that an electronic contact is a substitute for a face-to-face contact. If it instead is a complement, 
the increased use of information technology might actually increase the policy relevance of the 
cost of transporting people. Gaspar & Glaeser also provide some evidence from a previous revo-
lution in information technology, namely the introduction of telephones, which suggest that elec-
tronic contact actually may be a complement to face-to-face interaction.  IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   6 
gitudes and latitudes) of the establishments’ locations are available in the data, 
which implies that the geographical structure of the local economy can be rep-
resented in a flexible way.  
The paper extends and complements the previous literature in some re-
spects. Firstly, it demonstrates that matched employee-establishment data may 
be useful for dealing with imperfect substitutability when estimating the exter-
nal returns to education in a wage or earnings equation framework. The use of 
establishment data resembles the approach of Moretti (2004c) who uses plant 
level data to estimate the external return to education. However, Moretti 
(2004c) estimates the external return to education in a production framework 
rather than in an earnings equation framework. Secondly, the present paper 
adds spatial structure to the empirical models to see if the evidence on external-
ities is ‘coherent’ with the idea that face-to-face interactions are relevant for the 
transmission of externalities.
8 In this sense it resembles the investigation in 
Conley et al (2003). But unlike Conley et al, the data used here make it possi-
ble to address the issue of imperfect substitutability between workers with dif-
ferent levels of education directly. Finally, in light of the mixed results in pre-
vious work, an investigation of external effects of education on Swedish data 
might be informative regarding such effects in other countries too. The reason 
is that the private economic returns to education are relatively low in Sweden 
compared to other developed countries. This might suggest a relatively large 
difference between the private and the social economic returns to education. 
Thus, if the Swedish evidence would indicate no external effects of education 
on earnings, this might be suggestive also for other developed countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical motivations of the em-
pirical models are provided in section 2. The empirical models are presented in 
section 3 together with some econometric issues. Section 4 contains a descrip-
tion of the data and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                      
8 See Rosenbaum (2002) pp 5-6 and chapter 9 for a discussion of ‘coherence’ in observational 
studies. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  7 
2. Theoretical framework 
This section first outlines a basic theoretical framework to measure educational 
externalities (section 2.1). It then turns to discuss geographical issues regarding 
the transmission of externalities and how they may be modeled (section 2.2). 
Finally, it discusses other explanations of the spatial variation in earnings that 
may be relevant to consider when measuring educational externalities (section 
2.3). 
 
2.1 The basic model
9 
Assume that there are no other factors of production but K different kinds of 
workers characterized by their educational attainment, and that the production 
technology is characterized by constant returns to scale at the level of the firm. 
Assume that in a given geographical area g (g = 1, 2, ..., G) all establishments e 
(e = 1, 2, ..., Eg) have access to the following production function at time t (t = 
1, 2, ..., T). 
 
() eKt t e t e gt egt N N N F A Y ,..., , * 2 1 =  
 
where  egt Y  is the output which is traded in a perfectly competitive market at a 
price normalized to one;  gt A  denotes the total factor productivity in area g, as-
sumed to be taken as exogenous by the establishment; and  ekt N  (k = 1, 2, ..., 
K) is the number of workers employed in the establishment having attained 
educational level k. 
Educational externalities are assumed to enter the model through total factor 
productivity in area g. Specifically, assume that  
 
( ) egt t gt S A − + = 1 0 exp θ θ ,      (TFP1) 
 
where  egt S−  is a measure of the average educational attainment of the work-
force in area g outside establishment e, and  1 θ  measures the external effect of 
education. Note that the externality is assumed to affect total factor productiv-
                                                      
9 The theoretical framework presented in this section is basically an adaptation of the theoretical 
models presented by, for example, Rauch (1993) or Moretti (2004a), to the available data of the 
present paper. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   8 
ity in a Hicks neutral way. The parameter  t 0 θ  captures the effect of other time 
varying variables at the national level on total factor productivity. 
Profit maximization implies that  ( ) gkt eKt t e t e k gt w N N N F A = ,..., , 2 1  for all 
e and k where  k F  denotes the first-order partial derivative of  ( ) • F  with re-
spect to the kth argument and  gkt w  is the wage of workers with educational 
level k in area g at point in time t. Taking the natural logarithm of the equilib-
rium wage for each type of worker k in area g gives 
 
() eKt t e t e k gt gkt N N N F A w ,..., , ln ln ln 2 1 + =  
 
A first-order Taylor approximation of this relation around the national 
symmetric equilibrium gives for each type of worker k employed in establish-
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where  kt N  (k = 1, 2, ..., K) is the national average number of workers having 
attained educational level k with the average taken over all establishments;  lk F  
(l = 1, 2, ..., K) denotes the partial derivative of  k F  with respect to the lth ar-
gument. Diminishing marginal productivity implies that  0 ≤ kk F , but the sec-
ond-order cross partial derivatives may be either positive or negative depending 
on whether two types of workers are complements or substitutes in production.  
Thus, the equilibrium wage within the geographical area suggests that the 
marginal product of each type of worker is equalized across establishments lo-
cated in the same geographical area. However, if workplace related amenities 
affect the utility of working in a specific establishment, the equilibrium wage 
may also vary between establishments in the same area to compensate for such 
amenities according to the standard theory of compensating wage differentials 
(see for example Rosen, 1986).  
Assuming that workers are mobile, the spatial equilibrium distribution of 
wages and workers is characterized by equalizing utilities across workers in 
different locations (cf Roback, 1982 and 1988, Rauch, 1993, and Moretti, 
2004b). Hence, nominal wages vary across space, since other variables affect-IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  9 
ing the individual’s utility, such as costs of living and local amenities, also vary 
across space. The spatial equilibrium distribution of establishments is charac-
terized by a zero profit condition for establishments producing the traded good. 
Therefore, if nominal wages tend to be higher in areas with high levels of hu-
man capital, there has to be some advantages to the firm of locating production 
in such a place to motivate the higher nominal wage costs in these labor mar-
kets. Otherwise, it would be profitable to relocate production to other geo-
graphical areas. This is also the main motivation for using the nominal wage 
rather than a wage that is adjusted for geographical differences in the cost of 
living as the dependent variable in the empirical analysis. 
In sum, this basic model suggests that the spatial variation in the equilib-
rium wage of a worker with educational attainment k is due to variation in total 
factor productivity and to variation in the educational composition of the work-
force at the individual’s establishment; that is, variation in the vector 
() eKt t e t e N N N ,..., , 2 1 . Obviously, there are other explanations of this variation, 
some of which are discussed in section 2.3. 
 
2.2 The geographical scope of externalities 
The framework outlined in the previous section does not explicitly model the 
mechanism through which externalities work. If face-to-face interactions are 
relevant for the transmission of externalities it seems reasonable to provide 
some spatial structure to model the costs of these interactions (as in Conley et 




If individuals cross administrative borders to interact with people outside the 
geographical area in which the own establishment is located, it seems reason-
able to assume that educational externalities cross the same borders. A variable 
that may be described as a measure of the accessibility to human capital in 
other geographical areas is used to capture such cross-border effects of educa-
tional externalities. This variable will be called the transport-cost-weighted 







jt gjt gt S d TCWS
1   
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where  gjt d  is a measure of the costs of transporting people from region g to re-
gion j including time costs; and  jt S  is the average educational attainment of 
individuals employed in municipality j. 
Thus, spatial structure is added to equation 1 by modeling the total factor 
productivity of establishment e in area g as  
 
gt egt t egt TCWS S A 2 1 0 ln θ θ θ + + = −      (TFP2) 
 
where the parameter  1 θ  is used to capture the externalities arising within the 
own geographical area, and  2 θ  is used to assess the effect on total factor pro-
ductivity of accessibility to human capital in the surrounding geographical ar-




If the data set contains information on the geographical coordinates; i e, the 
longitude and the latitude of the establishments, another way of adding spatial 
structure to the model in a relatively flexible manner is to create a set of circles 
each with a different radius around each establishment. It is then possible to ob-
tain the average educational attainment of the work-force within the borders of 
each pair of circles; i e, to measure the educational attainment of the work-
force at different distances from the establishment. This implies that the em-
pirical analysis does not have to rely on some predetermined geographical unit 
of observation.  
More formally, it is possible to model total factor productivity at each geo-














et S−  (d = 1, 2, ..., 4) is the average educational attainment of the work-
force outside establishment e at a maximum distance of, say, 5 kilometers (d = 
1), between 5 and 10 kilometers (d = 2), between 10 and 15 kilometers (d = 3), 
and between 15 and 20 kilometers (d = 4). Hence, if distance matters to the 
spread of educational externalities we would expect to see that the effect de-
cays with distance, i e,  4 3 2 1 θ θ θ θ > > > . Note that here it is irrelevant in 
which geographical area the establishment is located, only the coordinates of IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  11 
the establishment are relevant. For this reason the subscript relating to geo-
graphical area (g) is dropped in TFP3. 
Each of these two alternative ways of adding spatial structure to the model 
has some distinct advantages. There are two advantages of TFP2 compared to 
TFP3: (1) If the cost of transporting people is relevant to the transmission of 
educational externalities, it might be relevant from a policy perspective to di-
rectly address such costs when adding spatial structure to the model; and (2) it 
is likely that transport costs provide a more relevant metric for measuring he 
interaction between individuals in different geographical areas than the Euclid-
ean distance used in TFP3. A potential advantage of TFP3 as compared to 
TFP2 is, however, that it does not rely on administratively set borders between 
the geographical units of observation  
 
2.3 Other explanations of the spatial variation in wages 
There are, of course, other explanations of the spatial variation in wages and 
earnings which are relevant to address in an empirical assessment of educa-
tional externalities. Beside knowledge spillovers, Marshall (1920) suggested 
that large markets provide demand and supply linkages that may benefit pro-
duction. This idea is also the point of departure of the so-called “new economic 
geography” where agglomeration of economic activity is explained as an inter-
action between increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm, transportation 
costs and labor mobility.
10  
Demand linkages may be relevant both within a geographical area and be-
tween geographical areas. Linkages within an area may be summarized by a 
measure of the “economic size” of the area itself, such as the total employment 
in the area as suggested by Ciccone & Peri (2004), for example. Demand link-
ages between geographical areas may be summarized by the so-called “market 
potential”, which has a long tradition in empirical regional economics (see Har-
ris, 1954, for an early example). The recent work in the “new economic geog-
raphy” has also provided the market potential with a solid theoretical underpin-
ning. The market potential of a geographical area is basically a weighted sum 
of the purchasing power of the surrounding geographical areas, where the 
weights are related to the transport costs to each one of these areas. Hanson 
(2004) presents the first empirical investigation of the market potential relying 
on “structural” estimation equations, and the results are supportive for the new 
theoretical work on economic geography. The present paper does not provide a 
structural estimation framework for the market potential since the market po-
                                                      
10 See Krugman (1991a and 1991b) for early work in this field or the textbook by Fujita et al 
(1999) or the surveys by Fujita & Thisse (1996) and Ottaviano & Puga (1998). IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   12
tential itself is not in the focus of the paper. Instead it relies on reduced form 
versions of the market potential. 
Measures of demand linkages tend to be strongly correlated with the educa-
tional attainment of the labor force. This underscores the relevance of control-
ling for the market potential in an empirical investigation of educational exter-
nalities. When adding measures of demand linkages within and between geo-
graphical areas to the empirical model, it seems reasonable to introduce them in 
a way which is consistent with the model of the educational externality, how-
ever. The motivation is that this avoids a possible misspecification of the em-
pirical model that may bias the results in favor of one of the explanations for 
the spatial variation in wages and earnings. Hence, when TFP1 in section 2.1 is 
used to model the externality it seems reasonable to include a control variable 
for the size of the geographical area’s internal market and not include a control 
variable that reflects linkages between geographical units of observation. The 
reason is that TFP1 constrains the externality to zero between different geo-
graphical areas. Ciccone & Peri (2004) suggest that the size of the internal 
market may be modeled by total employment in the area. In the present paper I 
basically follow their approach but exclude those employed in the establish-
ment where the individual works.
11 
Furthermore, when modeling the spatial scope of the externality as in TFP2 














jt gjt egt egt Z d Z MP
1
2 1 λ λ ,  
 
where  egt Z−  is total employment in the geographical area g outside the own es-
tablishment;  jt Z  is total employment in geographical area j;  gjt d  is a measure 
of transport costs between geographical areas g and j at point in time t. 
Finally, when modeling the geographical scope of educational externalities 
as in TFP3 in section 2.2, it seems reasonable to model the market potential in 
the same vein. For this reason the following reduced form market potential 
function is used together with TFP3 in the empirical model 
 
                                                      
11 Usually, it is total income that matters to aggregate demand. Using total income in an earnings 
equation framework probably creates an endogeneity problem, however, since individual earn-
ings are part of total income. Hence, I choose to use employment instead of income when model-












et Z−  (d = 1, 2, ..., 4) is total employment outside establishment e at a 
maximum distance of, say, 5 kilometers (d = 1), between 5 and 10 kilometers 
(d = 2), between 10 and 15 kilometers (d = 3), and between 15 and 20 kilome-
ters (d = 4). Hence, if transport costs are relevant to demand linkages we would 
expect that  4 3 2 1 λ λ λ λ > > > . 
Another explanation of the spatial variation in wages and earnings is spatial 
variation in the industry structure. The industry structure may in turn vary be-
cause of differences in natural advantages of production (see Kim, 1995 and 
1999, and Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). One obvious example is mining. In addi-
tion, spatial variation in wages may result from spatial variation in individual-
specific characteristics related to human capital accumulation and labor market 
attachment, for example: age, age-squared and the sex of the individual. Hence, 
it seems relevant to control for the industry classification of the establishments 
and observable individual-specific characteristics in the empirical models. 
  
3. Empirical models 
This section starts with a presentation of the basic empirical model in section 
3.1, and then turns to a presentation of the models where more spatial structure 
is added to the model in section 3.2. Endogeneity problems of these models are 
subsequently discussed in section 3.3. 
 
3.1 The basic empirical model 
The basic empirical model of the present paper is a variant of the model pre-
sented by Rauch (1993), but it circumvents the problem of imperfect substitut-
ability of workers with different levels of educational attainment by presuming 
disaggregate data on individuals and the establishments in which they work. 
With this type of data it is possible to let the marginal product of each type of 
worker depend both on the average educational attainment of the work-force 
outside the individual’s establishment, and on the educational attainment of the 
workforce in the establishment (as suggested in section 2.1). The external ef-IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   14
fect of education is thus identified with information on the educational attain-
ment of the workforce outside the individual’s establishment.
12  
The explanatory variables of the model have been motivated in section 2. 
The basic theoretical model of section 2.1 also suggested that the parameters 
related to the educational attainment of the individual’s co-workers depended 
on the educational attainment of the individual. Hence, some parameters in the 
benchmark model will be educational-specific. The benchmark empirical 
model of this paper is given by 
 
iegt it egt egt k egt k egt t iegt λ Z S y ε α θ θ + Φ + Λ + + Β + + + = − − X W N 1 0  (1) 
 
where  iegt y  is the natural logarithm of annual earnings of individual i (i = 1, 
2,…, Ie) working in establishment e (e = 1, 2, ..., Eg), in geographical area g (g 
= 1, 2, ..., G) in year t (t = 1, 2, ..., T) with educational attainment k; S-egt is the 
average educational attainment of the work-force in establishments outside the 
own establishment;  egt N  is the vector of the educational attainment of the 
workforce in the individual’s establishment, i e, the number of workers in the 
individual’s establishment that has attained each educational level (k = 1, 2, ..., 
K);  egt Z−  is total employment in the geographical area outside the own estab-
lishment;  egt W  contains a set of industry dummies; and  it X  contains the indi-
vidual-specific characteristics: age, age-squared and a dummy variable that 
equals one if the individual is male.  
Note that the educational-level-specific intercept  k α  in equation 1 may be 
interpreted as the national average marginal product of k level workers. This 
estimate is, however, obtained by including dummy variables for own educa-
tional attainment using the lowest educational level as the reference category. 
Therefore the estimates of the private return to educational levels are obtained 
as the relative difference between the lowest educational level and the own 
educational level. In addition, the vector  k Β  captures how the educational at-
tainment of the work-force in the individual’s establishment affects the mar-
ginal product of k level workers, and hence the demand for such workers. Since 
these parameters were derived as the quotients between the partial derivatives 
of the marginal product of k level workers and the marginal product itself, they 
                                                      
12 Cf Moretti (2004c), who estimates the external effects of education on productivity using plant 
level data, and identifies the external effect from variation in educational attainment outside the 
plant. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  15 
naturally vary between different educational categories. For a well behaved 
production function we would also expect to see: (1)  0 <
k
k Β  for all k, where 
k
k Β  is the kth element of the vector  k Β , representing the quotient between 
kk F , the partial derivative of the marginal product of level k workers and the 
corresponding marginal product itself  k F , and (2), due to Young’s theorem, 
sign(
l
k Β ) = sign(
k
l Β ) where 
l
k Β  is the quotient between  lk F ; i e, the partial 
derivative of  k F  with respect to the lth argument, and  k F , and 
k
l Β  is similarly 
defined. 
There have been two suggestions in the literature on how to define the vari-
able for the average educational attainment of the work-force outside the indi-
vidual’s establishment. Rauch (1993), Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) and Cic-
cone & Peri (2004) use the average years of schooling in the geographical unit 
of observation (city or state) . This choice implies that the external effect of in-
creasing the average educational attainment in an area is assumed to be homo-
geneous across the educational distribution. Moretti (2004b) uses instead col-
lege educated. This choice constrains, instead, the potentially positive external 
effects of lower educations to be zero. I have chosen to use average years of 
schooling but I have also tested all empirical models using the share of workers 
having attained a longer university education or a post graduate education. 
Qualitatively, the results were not sensitive to whether years of schooling or the 
share of university educated were used. In the following, I therefore only pre-
sent the results pertaining to average years of schooling in the following.  
This paper uses Swedish municipalities as the basic geographical unit of 
measurement.
13 The municipality is the lowest level administrative area in 
Sweden. However, the municipalities differ to a large extent with respect to the 
density of economic activity. This implies that the geographical unit of meas-
urement used here will be more heterogeneous than, for example, metropolitan 
areas, which underscores the need to provide more spatial structure to the basic 
empirical model. One of the models presented below is therefore based on the 
coordinates of the establishment’s location. Hence two types of geographical 
unit of observation are used here. 
 
                                                      
13 Previous work in this field has used such diverse geographical areas as US Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas, SMSAs (Rauch, 1993, Ciccone & Peri, 2004 and Moretti, 2004b) and 
the states of the USA (Angrist & Acemoglu, 2000 and Ciccone & Peri, 2004) when constructing 
the average educational attainment in the individual’s labor market. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   16
3.2 Empirical model with additional spatial structure 
The second model adds spatial information to equation 1 in the way outlined in 
section 2.2. The first alternative estimation equation thus becomes  
 
iegt it egt egt k egt k
gt egt t iegt TCWS S y
ε α
θ θ θ
+ Φ + Λ + + Β + +
+ + + = −
X W λ Z N
2 1 0
   (2) 
 
where the transport-cost-weighted educational attainment ( gt TCWS ) is defined 
in accordance with S-egt ; that is, it is based on the average years of schooling. 
Generalized commuting costs between the municipalities are used as weights in 
the construction of  gt TCWS .
14 Furthermore,  egt Z  in equation 2 is a vector 
containing total employment in the own municipality outside establishment e, 
and the transport-cost-weighted sum of the surrounding municipalities’ total 
employment. The remaining variables in equation 2 are the same as those in 
equation 1.
  
The second alternative of adding spatial structure presented in section 2.2 




et k et k
et et et et t iet S S S S y
ε α
θ θ θ θ θ
+ Φ + Λ + + Β + +
+ + + + + =
−
− − − −













et S−  (d = 1, 2, ..., 4) is the average years of schooling of the work-force 
outside establishment e at a maximum distance of 5 kilometers (d = 1) from the 
establishment, between 5 and 10 kilometers (d = 2), between 10 and 15 kilome-
ters (d = 3), and between 15 and 20 kilometers (d = 4); 
) (d
et − Z is a vector contain-
ing the total employment at a maximum distance of 5 kilometers from the es-
tablishment (not including the employment in establishment e), between 5 and 
10 kilometers away, between 10 and 15 kilometers away, and between 15 and 
20 kilometers away; the remaining variables are the same as in equation 1.  
 
                                                      
14 Generalized commuting costs include both the monetary cost of travel and the value of time. It 
is, furthermore, a weighted average of different modes of transport with the weights determined 
by the relevant market shares. The same costs are used when constructing the transport-cost-
weighted sum of the surrounding municipalities’ total employment; that is, the market potential. 
See section 4 for further information regarding these costs. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  17 
3.3 Endogeneity problems  
The basic empirical model might be plagued by different kinds of endogeneity 
problems; i e, there are different reasons to believe that there exist a correlation 
between the error term and the average educational attainment of the workforce 
outside the individual’s establishment. This is also true of the models in section 
3.2 that add spatial structure to the analysis. Consequently, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator applied to equations 1, 2 and 3 might be biased and 
inconsistent. The primary reason for believing that there exist a correlation be-
tween the error term and the different measures of average educational attain-
ment outside the own establishment is that relevant variables have been omitted 
from the equations.  
First of all, an extensive literature has tried to control for unobserved indi-
vidual specific “ability” in empirical models of the private economic return to 
education (see Card, 1999, for a survey). Obviously, omitted individual-
specific ability could also bias cross-sectional estimators of the external effect 
of education. The motivation is that high-ability (or “career-oriented”) indi-
viduals might tend to be located in areas with relatively much human capital; 
that is, in areas where the average educational attainment of the labor force is 
high. For this reason I choose to include individual-specific fixed effects in the 
model, denoted by  i f  in the following. This suggests the following structure of 
the error term in equations 1, 2 and 3 
 
iegt i iegt f ν ε + = , 
 
where the first term on the right hand side is potentially correlated with the av-
erage educational attainment of the work-force outside the own establishment 
and the second term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory vari-
ables in the equations. A conventional fixed effects estimator is then applied to 
equations 1, 2 and 3; e g the fixed effects version of equation 1 is given by  
 
  
ie i eg g





∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ 1 0
+ Φ + Λ + +
+ Β + + + = −
X W
N
,   (4) 
 
where  s g ie iegt ieg y y y ' ' ∆ − = ;  iegt y  is defined in equation 1 and  s g ie y ' '  is the 
natural logarithm of the individual’s annual earnings in time period s in which 
he/she worked in establishment e’ (e’ = 1, 2, ..., Eg’), in municipality g’ (g’ = 1, 
2, ..., G). Note that e’ may be different from e and g’ may differ from g, since 
some people change establishment and municipality. All right-hand-side vari-
ables are defined accordingly.  IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   18
Since some individuals change the municipality in which they work, unob-
served natural advantages of a municipality that may affect the productivity of 
establishments located there are not completely accounted for when using 
equation 4.
15 Hence, if such unobserved variables both raise the marginal pro-
ductivity of workers and attract high educated workers, the error term in equa-
tion 4 may still be positively correlated with the average educational attain-
ment. I choose to deal with this potential correlation by including a set of 
dummy variables for the county in which the establishment is located.
 16 (The 
county is a larger geographical unit than the municipality.) 
The fixed effects estimator together with the dummy variables discussed 
above remove the effect of unobserved time-invariant variables in the analysis; 
in other words, unobservable variables that might explain both high (low) earn-
ings and a high (low) average educational attainment. Still, there may also exist 
time-varying omitted variables, the change in which may be correlated with 
changes in the average educational attainment of the workforce outside the own 
establishment. In the empirical analyses I assume, however, that such time 
varying variables are accounted for by the inclusion of the various measures of 
demand linkages in the analysis; i e, total employment in the municipality out-
side the own establishment and the market potential. This assumption is sup-
ported by the results in Moretti (2004b). He uses both an instrumental variables 
approach and a control variable approach to deal with these problems. More 
specifically, to control for exogenous demand shifts that may induce a spurious 
correlation between a change in the average educational attainment and the 
change in wages in a city, he includes a Katz and Murphy index (Katz & Mur-
                                                      
15 See Kim (1995 and 1999) and Elison & Glaeser (1999) for empirical evidence and discussions 
of natural advantage vs. the role of spillovers in locational decisions of firms in the US. There 
may obviously also exist important unobserved aspects of the establishment’s production tech-
nology that may motivate an establishment-specific fixed effect as well. I investigated such 
fixed-effects in equations 1, 2 and 3 but all of the results were quite similar to those obtained 
when accounting for the individuals-specific fixed effects. To save space I only consider unob-
served individual fixed effects and spatial heterogeneity in the text. It could be noted, however, 
that 83 percent of the individuals in the total sample used below are employed in the same mu-
nicipality in the two time periods, and 60 percent are employed in the same establishment. 
16 I also tested specifications with dummy variables for the municipality in which the establish-
ment is located. However, when using these dummy variables in equation 1, the estimated exter-
nal effect of education became unreasonably sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the vari-
ables pertaining to the educational attainment of the individual’s co-workers. The estimated ex-
ternal effect of education with municipality dummy variables in equation 1 tended to be positive 
without these variables in the equation, and tended to be negative when the municipality dum-
mies were included. For this reason I choose to model unobserved spatial heterogeneity through 
dummy variables defined at the level of the county instead. This leaves more variation in the av-
erage educational attainment outside the individual’s establishment, and leads to more stable re-
sults regarding the estimated external effect of education. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  19 
phy, 1992) in the estimation equation. His instrumental variable estimates of 
the external effects of education in this equation are all within one standard er-
ror of the corresponding ordinary least squares estimate. This indicates that 
with a suitable control variable for exogenous demand shifts, there should be 
little to be gained from using an instrumental variable approach. 
 
4. Data 
The data set is derived from Statistics Sweden’s (SCB) registers. It consists ba-
sically of two parts: one is a sample of employed individuals and the other is 
data on all establishments in Sweden. The individuals are sampled from ap-
proximately 10 percent of all establishments in 1998 and linked to their estab-
lishment in 1998 and 1993.
17 The sample is stratified with respect to the size 
and county-distribution of the establishments, so as to assure representativity.  
The analyses use information on individuals’ gross annual earnings, educa-
tional attainment, age, sex and identification number for his or her establish-
ment in 1998 and 1993. Information on gross annual earnings is collected from 
tax records.
18 Earnings in 1998 have been deflated to the 1993 price level with 
the consumer price index. The register information on educational attainment is 
collected from administrative records on completed degrees within the regular 
educational system, and is expressed in terms of the individual’s highest at-
tained educational level. There are seven mutually exclusive educational cate-
gories and an additional category for missing information on educational level. 
The sample of individuals is restricted to include individuals with non-missing 
information on own educational attainment, being at least 25 years old in 1993 
and at most 65 years in 1998. The motivation for the lower age limit is to ex-
clude individuals that may still be in the educational system. The motivation 
for the upper age limit is that this is the mandatory age of retirement in Swe-
den. The included individuals must also have had non-zero annual earnings in 
both 1993 and 1998. 
The regional variables are constructed from the establishment data. This 
data set includes the relevant information on the educational attainment of the 
workforce, industry classification and the location of the establishment. The 
                                                      
17 I have excluded sailors, farmers  and self-employed individuals from the sample.  
18 The earnings definition used here includes wage earnings, work related compensations and 
earnings from running an own enterprise. To see if the results were sensitive to the inclusion of 
the latter earnings component, I also estimated all versions of the basic model with a more nar-
row definition of earnings excluding this component. All results regarding the external effects of 
education were virtually the same with the more narrow earnings definition, however. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   20
average years of schooling of the workforce outside the individual’s establish-
ment is obtained by imputing the average years of schooling. The Swedish 
Level of Living Survey (SLLS) in 1991 is used to this end.
19 The SLLS con-
tains both register information on the highest attained educational level and 
self-reported years of schooling. This dual information is used to estimate a 
model that relates self-reported years of schooling to highest attained educa-
tional level. The results are used to impute years of schooling for each educa-
tional level, to construct the average years of schooling in each municipality. 
Information on travel costs between municipalities is obtained from a model 
used by the Swedish National Road Administration and the Swedish National 
Rail Administration. This source provides data on “generalized commuting 
costs” between municipalities in 1997 which are used to model travel costs 
both in 1993 and 1998. These costs include both monetary and time costs, and 
are obtained as a weighted average of costs associated with different modes of 
travel.
20 I also use the generalized commuting costs when constructing the mu-
nicipalities’ market potential. Municipalities are defined according to the 1995 
classification when there were 288 municipalities. 
Unfortunately, several establishments lack information on the longitude and 
latitude of the establishment’s geographical location. In terms of employees, in-
formation is missing for 22 percent of Sweden’s total employment in 1998. The 
TFP3 and the associated market potential presented in section 2 are based on 
establishments with non-missing information, and the empirical models are es-
timated on individuals that work in such establishments both in 1993 and 1998. 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the observable individual specific-
characteristics in the sample. Since model 3 is estimated on a smaller sample, 
due to the missing information on longitudes and latitudes of establishments, 
the table also presents descriptive statistics separately for this smaller sample. 
The first row shows that average earnings in 1998 in the total sample is ap-
proximately equal to 226 000 Swedish kronor (SEK), which is almost 21 per-
cent higher than the corresponding figure in 1993. Columns 3 and 4 display 
that average earnings in 1998 and 1993 is basically the same in the smaller 
sample.  
The dummy variables E1 – E7 indicate the highest attained educational 
level of the individual. The table suggests only minor changes over time in the 
educational level of the individuals in the sample. It also suggests no substan-
tial difference between the total sample and the smaller one. 
 
                                                      
19 See Fritzell & Lundberg (1994). 
20 Since there were no major changes in the transportation infrastructure between 1993 and 1998, 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Means and (standard deviations):  Individual 
characteristics 
 All  Smaller  sample 
  1998 1993  1998  1993 




225389      
(128001) 
187961    
(102745) 




0.094         
(0.292) 
0.095        
(0.293) 




0.106         
(0.308) 
0.107        
(0.309) 




0.341         
(0.474) 
0.346        
(0.476) 




0.124         
(0.330) 
0.127        
(0.333) 




0.164         
(0.370) 
0.162        
(0.369) 




0.155         
(0.362) 
0.150        
(0.357) 




0.016         
(0.125) 
0.013        
(0.112) 
AGE, in 1998  45.783 
(9.075) 







-  0.488         
(0.500) 
- 
Sample Size  177 591  112 463 
Notes: Earnings are measured in the prices of 1993. Educational levels: 1=Compulsory school 
(<9 years), 2=Compulsory school (9 or 10 years), 3=Upper secondary school (≤ 2 years), 
4=Upper secondary school (> 2 years), 5=Post secondary school (< 3 years), 6=Post secondary 
school (≥ 3 years), 7=Post graduate education. The smaller sample refers to the sample of indi-
viduals working in establishments with information on geographical coordinates. 
 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics pertaining to municipalities and estab-
lishments. Note that the entries in this table are weighted averages with the 
weights given by the sample share of individuals in each municipality or estab-
lishment. The average years of schooling in the municipality (outside the own 
establishment) is almost 12 years in 1998 and was closer to 11.5 years in 1993. 
Furthermore, the average individual works in a municipality where some 
104000 individuals are employed in 1998 which is almost 16 percent higher 
than the corresponding figure in 1993. Average establishment employment is 
increasing between 1993 and 1998. The average individual of the smaller sam-
ple seems to be working in a smaller establishment that is located in a larger 
municipality than the average individual of the total sample. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   22
Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Means and (standard deviations) – Municipality 
characteristics and establishment characteristics
 
 All  Smaller  sample 
  1998 1993  1998  1993 
Average years of schooling
a   11.922      
(0.576) 
11.611    
(0.581) 
11.973       
(0.597) 
11.656    
(0.596) 
Employment
b   103718     
(158418) 
89680     
(133764) 
120533      
(172700) 





5.789       
(2.232) 
5.607     
(2.194) 
5.962        
(2.279) 









8077        
(4986) 
7426      
(4568) 




336         
(626) 
340       
(742) 
Sample Size  177 591  112463 
Note: The information is weighted by the sample share of individuals in each municipality or es-
tablishment.  
(a) Average years of schooling in the municipality outside the own establishment. 
(b) Employment in the municipality outside the own establishment. 
(c) Weighted sum of average years of schooling in the surrounding municipalities.  
(d) Weighted sum of employment in the surrounding municipalities.  
 
Table 3 reports further establishment characteristics for establishments with 
information on geographical coordinates. Note that the entries are weighted av-
erages with the weights given by the sample share of individuals in each estab-
lishment. The table first presents the average years of schooling at different dis-
tances from the establishment. These entries suggest that individuals tend to 
have their establishment located in an area where the average educational at-
tainment is relatively high. For example, average years of schooling among 
workers outside the own establishment at a maximum distance of 5 kilometers 
is 12 years in 1998, and the average years of schooling among workers further 
away is decreasing monotonically with the distance. This decline in the average 
educational attainment is also seen for the entries referring to 1993. Total em-
ployment is also largest within a circle with radius 5 kilometers from the estab-
lishment and then falls off with distance from the establishment. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: Means and (standard deviations) –
Establishment characteristics for establishments with information on longitudes 
and latitudes. 
 1998  1993 
Years of schooling, Distance≤5 km
a  12.019           
(0.646) 
11.696          
(0.644) 
Years of schooling, 5<distance ≤ 10km
b  11.715           
(0.755) 
11.356          
(0.993) 
Years of schooling, 10<distance≤15 km
c  11.634           
(0.686) 
11.335          
(0.948) 
Years of schooling, 15<distance≤20 km
d  11.595           
(0.651) 
11.294          
(0.860) 
Employment, distance≤5 km
e  73146          
(110002) 
61024          
(91245) 
Employment, 5<distance≤10 km
f  57467           
(93510) 
45845          
(75859) 
Employment, 10<distance≤15 km
g  38338           
(68333) 
31494          
(57953) 
Employment, 15<distance≤20 km
h  26101           
(47092) 
21218          
(39072) 
Sample Size  112 463 
Note: The information is weighted by the sample share of individuals in each establishment.  
(a) Average years of schooling of employed individuals outside the individual’s establishment 
within a circle of radius 5 kilometers from the own establishment.  
(b-d) Average years of schooling of employed individuals within two circles with radii 5 and 10; 
10 and 15; and 15 and 20 kilometers, respectively from the establishment.  
(e-h) Employment outside the individual’s establishment. Distances defined in accordance with 
years of schooling distances. 
 
5. Results 
This section begins with a presentation of the cross-sectional results in section 
5.1, before turning to the fixed effects results in section 5.2. Within both of 
these sub-sections the results are first presented for the basic empirical model 
in equation 1 whereupon the results obtained with equations 2 and 3 are pre-
sented; that is, the equations that add spatial structure to the model of the exter-
nality. 
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5.1 Cross-sectional results 
 
5.1.1 The basic empirical model 
Table 4 presents the results from a series of different specifications of the basic 
model; that is, equation 1. The first specification only includes variables for the 
individual’s educational attainment, age and a male dummy variable. The in-
tention of this specification is simply to present a set of benchmark estimates 
for the private economic return to education, and see how these returns are af-
fected when including the variable used to measure the externality.  
The second specification in Table 4 includes the average years of schooling 
in the municipality outside the individual’s establishment. The estimated exter-
nal effect of education obtained with this specification suggests that a one-year 
increase in the average years of schooling would raise earnings by approxi-
mately 9 percent. The second column suggests, furthermore, that the private re-
turns are negatively, albeit very modestly, affected by the inclusion of the vari-
able for the externality. 
The third specification in Table 4 intends to deal with the issue of imperfect 
substitutability between workers with different educational attainment.
21 This 
specification thus includes a set of control variables for the number of workers 
at the individual’s establishment having attained each one of eight educational 
categories, interacted with the dummy variables for own educational attain-
ment.
22 It also includes a set of industry dummies based on two-digit industry 
codes. The results suggest that the external effect is approximately 25 percent 
lower than in the specification that excludes these control variables. Hence, this 
result indicates a relatively large positive bias in estimates of the external effect 
of education obtained in models that fail to account for imperfect substitutabil-
ity, which is basically in line with the conclusions of Ciccone & Peri (2004). 
The private economic returns to education obtained with this specification also 
tend to be higher than in the second specification. 
 
                                                      
21 See the discussions in Ciccone & Peri (2004) and Moretti (2004b). 
22 I have included the category of workers with missing information on educational attainment so 
that these control variables sum to the total number of workers at the establishment. The results 
on the external effect of education are, however, not sensitive to this choice. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  25 
Table 4. Model 1 – Stacked OLS 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Municipality years of 
schooling
a 
-  0.091   
(0.014) 
0.068   
(0.013) 
0.061   
(0.017) 





0.087   
(0.007) 
0.073   
(0.005) 
0.084   
(0.005) 
0.074   
(0.005) 





0.106   
(0.007) 
0.093   
(0.005) 
0.121   
(0.004) 
0.094   
(0.005) 





0.235   
(0.012) 
0.207   
(0.006) 
0.214   
(0.005) 
0.207   
(0.006) 





0.266   
(0.010) 
0.239   
(0.007) 
0.291   
(0.007) 
0.241   
(0.007) 





0.481   
(0.013) 
0.446   
(0.008) 
0.515   
(0.009) 
0.446   
(0.008) 





0.719   
(0.043) 
0.651   
(0.056) 
0.754   
(0.026) 
0.649   
(0.059) 
0.759   
(0.026) 
Age  0.048   
(0.002) 
0.049   
(0.002) 
0.048   
(0.002) 
0.049   
(0.002) 
0.048   
(0.002) 
Age-squared/100  -0.048   
(0.002) 
-0.049   
(0.002) 
-0.047   
(0.002) 
-0.049   
(0.002) 
-0.047   
(0.002) 
Male  0.365   
(0.007) 
0.365   
(0.006) 
0.286   
(0.005) 
0.365   
(0.006) 





-  -  -  0.171   
(0.056) 
0.145   
(0.042) 
Co-workers education
i  No No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies
j  No No Yes No Yes 
R
2 – Adjusted  0.352 0.365 0.420 0.367 0.421 
Number of individuals  177 591 
Notes: Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual earnings in 1998 and 1993. Standard er-
rors robust to clustering at the level of the municipality in parentheses. All specifications are es-
timated with separate intercepts for 1993 and 1998.  
(a) See note a Table 2. 
(b-g) See notes to Table 1.  
(h) See note b Table 2.  
(i) The number of individuals having attained each of 7 educational levels and a separate cate-
gory for those with missing information on educational level interacted with dummy variables 
for the individual’s educational level.  
(j) Based on two-digit-industry codes. 
 
Specification 4 in Table 4 ignores the issue of imperfect substitutability and 
instead includes a control variable for the size of the market in the municipal-
ity, namely total employment in the municipality outside the individual’s estab-
lishment. This specification suggests that increasing the average years of IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   26
schooling by one year will lead to a 6 percent increase in individual earnings. 
This also implies a positive bias in the estimated external effect of education in 
the specification that ignores the role of large markets and demand linkages; i e 
specification 2 in the table. Furthermore, working in a municipality with a high 
employment level has a positive effect on earnings as suggested by the signifi-
cantly positive parameter for municipality employment outside the individual’s 
establishment. 
The fifth specification reported in Table 4 controls both for imperfect sub-
stitutability between workers with different educational attainment, demand 
linkages (employment outside the own establishment) and industry dummies. 
The estimated effect of increasing the average years of schooling outside the 
individual’s establishment by one year is now associated with a 4 percent in-
crease in individual earnings. This effect is significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels of significance. The point estimate is substantially lower 
than in the second specification that ignored both the issue of imperfect substi-
tutability and demand linkages. The two 95 percent confidence intervals of the 
parameter in the two specifications are overlapping, however, suggesting that 
the difference is not significant.  
 
5.1.2 Empirical models with additional spatial structure 
Table 5 presents results from the use of two variables to measure the external-
ity: one that measures the average educational attainment in the municipality 
outside the individual’s establishment, and one that consists of a weighted sum 
of the average educational attainment in the surrounding municipalities (TFP2 
in section 2). Specification 1 in Table 5 includes these two variables together 
with control variables for the individual’s educational attainment, age, age-
square and a male dummy variable. Both of the estimated parameters for the 
educational externalities are positive and different from zero at conventional 
levels of significance. This suggests externalities of education across munici-
pality borders. It can be noted that the external effect of the average years of 
schooling in the municipality outside the own establishment is substantially 
lower than the corresponding estimate in Table 4, column 2. This reflects a 
positive relationship between the average educational attainment in a munici-
pality and the accessibility to human capital in the surrounding municipalities. 
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Table 5. Model 2 – Stacked OLS 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Municipality years of 
schooling
a 
0.067   
(0.012) 
0.048   
(0.009) 
0.036   
(0.016) 





1.161   
(0.235) 
1.034   
(0.207) 
-0.205   
(0.383) 





-  -  0.210   
(0.062) 





-  -  0.541   
(0.193) 
0.662   
(0.117) 
Co-workers education
e  No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies
f  No Yes No Yes 
R
2 – Adjusted  0.368 0.421 0.369 0.423 
Number of individuals  177 591 
Notes: Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual earnings in 1998 and 1993. Specifica-
tions include control variables for the individual’s age, age-squared, educational attainment, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the individual is male and separate intercepts for 1993 and 
1998. Standard errors robust to clustering at the level of the municipality in parentheses.  
(a) See note a in Table 2.  
(b) See note c in Table 2.  
(c) See note b Table 2.  
(d) See note d in Table 2.  
(e-f) See notes i and j Table 4.  
 
Specification 2 in Table 5 includes control variables to account for industry 
structure and imperfect substitutability between workers with different educa-
tional attainment. This lowers both of the estimated external effects of educa-
tion. The relative effect of including the control variables is larger on the pa-
rameter measuring the external effects occurring within the municipality. This 
result seems reasonable if most of the effect from failing to account for imper-
fect substitutability is operating relatively close to the establishment.  
In specification 3 the inclusion of the control variables for the market poten-
tial has, instead, a more marked effect on the estimated external effect of edu-
cation in the surrounding municipalities, which becomes negative and insig-
nificantly different from zero. The external effect of education in the own mu-
nicipality is relatively low but still significantly different from zero at the five 
percent level of significance. Note also that both of the variables that intend to 
measure the market potential are positive and different from zero at conven-
tional levels of significance. The results from specification 3 lend support to IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   28
the idea that externalities are important at shorter distances whereas demand 
linkages are important over larger geographical areas.
23 
Specification 4 in Table 5 includes both control variables for imperfect sub-
stitutability between workers with different educational attainment, industry 
dummies and market potential. This specification suggest even lower external 
effects to education in the own municipality. In fact, the estimated external ef-
fect of average years of schooling in the municipality outside the individual’s 
establishment is not significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of 
significance in this specification. Moreover, the results obtained with this 
specification actually suggest a negative effect from the average years of 
schooling in the surrounding municipalities, which is different from zero at the 
10 percent level of significance. This might reflect that gainful interactions in 
the own municipality are relocated to the surrounding municipalities when 
these municipalities have large stocks of human capital.
24 
Table 6 presents the cross-sectional results pertaining to the second way of 
adding spatial structure to the empirical model (TFP3 in section 2), by measur-
ing the average educational attainment at four different distances from the es-
tablishment. Note that the sample used to estimate the external effects of edu-
cation with this model is smaller than that used to estimate models 1 and 2. 
This is due to missing values on the establishments’ geographical coordinates. 
Specification 1 in Table 6 includes the four variables for the average years of 
schooling at different maximum distances from the individual’s establishment 
(excluding years of schooling in the own establishment). The magnitude of the 
estimated parameters suggests indeed that the external effect of education is 
declining in distance, although it does not seem to be declining monotonically. 
The estimated external effect is largest for average years of schooling close to 
the establishment, suggesting that an increase in the average years of schooling 
by one year would increase the individual’s earnings by approximately 5 per-
cent. The effect is substantially smaller when the distance is between 5 and 10 
kilometers where a corresponding increase in average years of schooling would 
lead to an increase in the individual’s earnings by some 1.5 percent. The corre-
sponding effect is approximately 2 percent at the distance 10 to 15 kilometers. 
Finally, at a distance between 15 and 20 kilometers from the establishment, an 
increase in the average years of schooling would lead to an increase in the indi-
vidual’s earnings by approximately 1 percent. All of the estimated parameters 
are different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance in specification 1. 
                                                      
23 See for example Ottaviano & Puga (1998). 
24 Boarnet (1998) reports a similar finding for infrastructural capital which seems to have a nega-
tive spillover effect on neighbouring areas. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  29 
Specification 2 adds the control variables for imperfect substitutability be-
tween workers with different educational attainment. This reduces the esti-
mated external effect of average years of schooling at all distances. In fact, it is 
only the parameters associated with average years of schooling at a maximum 
distance of 5 kilometers and at the distance between 10 and 15 kilometers that 
are significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance.  
Specification 3 is used to investigate how the inclusion of employment at 
different distances from the establishment affects the estimated external effects 
of education, where the distances are the same as those used to measure the ex-
ternal effects of education. This specification suggests that the inclusion of this 
measure of the market potential reduces the estimates of the external effects of 
education at all distances but the one furthest away from the municipality. This 
is somewhat surprising since the third specification of model 2 suggested that 
controlling for the market potential in the analysis lowered the external effects 
from education located far away from the establishment; cf Table 5, column 3. 
It could also be noted that it is only the parameters related to years of schooling 
at a maximum distance of 5 kilometers from the establishment and at a distance 
between 15 and 20 kilometers that are different from zero at the 10 percent 
level of significance. 
Specification 4 controls for imperfect substitutability between workers with 
different educational attainment, industry dummies and the employment at dif-
ferent distances from the establishment. This specification suggests that the pa-
rameter related to years of schooling at a maximum distance of 5 kilometers is 
positive and different from zero at conventional levels of significance. This es-
timate suggests that increasing the years of schooling by 1 year will tend to 
raise the individual’s earnings by some 1.5 percent. The parameter related to 
years of schooling at a distance between 5 and 10 kilometers from the estab-
lishment is negative and different from zero at the 10 percent level, hence sug-
gesting negative spillovers between close locations. As in model 2, this nega-
tive spillover might be interpreted as gainful interactions being relocated from 
the own location if the stock of human capital is relatively large in nearby loca-
tions. Years of schooling at further distances do not have any significant effects 
in this specification.  IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   30
Table 6. Model 3 – Stacked OLS 
Specification (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Years of schooling, dis-
tance ≤ 5 km
a 
0.053   
(0.010) 
0.045   
(0.005) 
0.017   
(0.009) 
0.015   
(0.005) 
Years of schooling,  
5 < distance ≤ 10 km
b 
0.015   
(0.008) 
0.000   
(0.003) 
0.003   
(0.006) 
-0.005   
(0.003) 
Years of schooling,  
10 < distance ≤ 15 km
c 
0.020   
(0.006) 
0.016   
(0.004) 
0.008   
(0.006) 
0.004   
(0.003) 
Years of schooling,  
15 < distance ≤ 20 km
d 
0.009   
(0.005) 
0.005   
(0.003) 
0.009   
(0.005) 
0.003   
(0.003) 
Employment/1000 000,  
distance ≤ 5 km
e 
-  -  0.152   
(0.094) 
0.192   
(0.042) 
Employment/1000 000,  
5 < distance ≤ 10 km
f 
-  -  0.366   
(0.158) 
0.184   
(0.058) 
Employment/1000 000,  
10 < distance ≤ 15 km
g 
-  -  0.137   
(0.123) 
0.211   
(0.074) 
Employment/1000 000,  
15 < distance ≤ 20 km
h 
-  -  0.091   
(0.124) 
0.124   
(0.085) 
Co-workers education
i  No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies
j  No Yes No Yes 
R
2 – Adjusted  0.359 0.416 0.364 0.419 
Number of individuals  112 463 
Notes: Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of annual earnings in 1998 and 1993. Specifica-
tions include control variables for the individual’s age, age-squared, educational attainment, a 
dummy variable that equals one if the individual is male and separate intercepts for 1993 and 
1998. Standard errors robust to clustering at the level of the establishment in parentheses.  
(a-d) See notes a-d to Table 3.  
(e-h) See notes e-h to Table 3.  
(i-j) See notes i and j to Table 4. 
 
5.2 Fixed effects estimates  
 
5.2.1 The basic empirical model 
Table 7 summarizes the results obtained with the fixed effects estimator ap-
plied to model 1. They suggest that the external effect is positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 10 percent level in specifications 1, 2 and 3; cf 
Table 7, row 1. But the fourth specification indicates no statistically significant 
external effects of education. 
The estimator may be biased because of omitted unobserved spatial charac-
teristics that the individual fixed effects estimator fails to remove for individu-
als that change the municipality in which they work. To investigate this, IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  31 
dummy variables for the county of the location was included in the model. 
Apart from specification 1, these results suggest that the external effect of edu-
cation is not different from zero at conventional levels of significance; cf Table 
7, row 2. 
 
Table 7. Model 1 – Fixed effects 
Measure of average educational attainment in the municipality: Municipality 
years of schooling
a 
Specification (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Individual Fixed Effects
b   0.026   
(0.006) 
0.020   
(0.005) 
0.013   
(0.007) 
0.006   
(0.007) 
Individual Fixed Effects 
and County Dummy Variables
b,c 
0.011   
(0.006) 
0.009   
(0.006) 
0.004   
(0.008) 
0.000   
(0.007) 
Municipality employment
d  - -  Yes  Yes 
Co-workers education
e  No Yes  No  Yes 
Industry dummies
f  No Yes  No  Yes 
Number of individuals  177 591 
Notes: Specifications include control variables for the individual’s educational attainment, age-
squared and an intercept term. Standard errors robust to clustering at the level of the municipality 
in parentheses.  
(a) See note a to Table 2.  
(b) The dependent variable is the difference between the natural logarithm of the individual’s an-
nual earnings in 1998 and in 1993.  
(c) County dummy variables refer to the within-individual difference between 1998 and 1993 in 
these dummy variables. 
(d) See note b to Table 2.  
(e-f) See notes i-j to Table 4.  
 
5.2.2 Empirical models with additional spatial structure 
The first two rows of Table 8 summarizes the basic fixed effects results for 
model 2; that is, the model that includes a transport-cost-weighted sum of the 
average years of schooling in the surrounding municipalities. These results 
suggest, in general, no statistically significant positive external effects of edu-
cation within the own municipality. The results do suggest, however, positive 
external effects of education from the surrounding municipalities in specifica-
tions 1 and 2. In specification 3 the effect is negative and significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels of significance, however. In addition, in the 
fourth and last specification both of the estimated parameters suggest negative 
external effects of education, both of which are significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level. This result could be due to relocations of gainful in-
teractions between nearby geographical locations. The negative effect of educa-IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   32
tion in the own municipality might indicate negative effects between locations 
within the municipality (cf the results in Table 9). 
 
Table 8. Model 2 – Fixed effects 
Specification (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Municipality years of 
schooling
a 
0.009   
(0.007)
0.001   
(0.006)
-0.008   
(0.007) 





c   Transport-cost-weighted 
years of schooling
b 
0.009   
(0.002)
0.011   
(0.002)
-0.012   
(0.003) 
-0.007   
(0.003) 
Municipality years of 
schooling
a 
0.002   
(0.008)
-0.003   
(0.007)
-0.003   
(0.008) 










0.008   
(0.004)
0.011   
(0.004)
0.007   
(0.007) 
-0.012   
(0.005) 
Municipality employment and transport-
cost-weighted employment
e 
- -  Yes  Yes 
Co-workers education
f  No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies
g  No Yes No Yes 
Number of individuals  177 591 
Notes: Specifications include control variables for the individual’s educational attainment, age-
squared and an intercept term. Standard errors robust to clustering at the level of the municipality 
in parentheses.  
(a) See note a in Table 4.  
(b) See note c in Table 2.  
(c-d) See notes b-c in Table 7.  
(e) See notes b and d in Table 2.  
(f-g) See notes i-j in Table 4.  
 
The first set of results obtained with the individual fixed effects estimator 
applied to equation 2 may, however, still be biased since unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity is not completely accounted for due to individuals that change 
the municipality in which they work. Therefore dummy variables for the 
county of location are included in the individual fixed effects estimation equa-
tion. The corresponding results are reported in rows 3 and 4 of Table 8. They 
indicate no statistically significant external effects of education within the own 
municipality. Specifications 1 and 2 indicate, however, positive and statistically 
significant external effects from education in the surrounding municipalities. 
Specification 3 indicates no statistically significant external effects of educa-
tion from the surrounding municipalities, whereas specification 4 suggests 
negative spillovers from education in the surrounding municipalities. 
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Table 9 presents the fixed effects results for model 3. As shown in the upper 
part of the table, the individual fixed effects estimator tends to produce results 
indicating both significantly positive and negative external effects of education. 
Specifications 1 and 2 suggest positive effects of years of schooling in the cir-
cle around the establishment with a radius of 5 kilometers and of years of 
schooling within the two circles with radii 10 and 15 kilometers. However, 
these effects are insignificantly different from zero in specifications 3 and 4. 
The latter specifications indicate instead a negative effect from years of school-
ing located within the two circles with radii 5 and 10 kilometers around the es-
tablishment. Including dummy variables for the county of location does not al-
ter these conclusions in any substantial way, cf the lower part of the table. 
 
Table 9. Model 3 – Fixed effects 
Specification (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Years of schooling, 
distance ≤ 5 km
a 
0.015   
(0.005)




0.002   
(0.005) 
Years of schooling,  
5 < distance ≤ 10 km
b 
-0.003   
(0.003)




-0.007   
(0.003) 
Years of schooling,  
10 < distance ≤ 15 km
c 
0.005   
(0.002)
0.006   
(0.002)
0.003   
(0.002) 







Years of schooling,  
15 < distance ≤ 20 km
d
0.003   
(0.003)
0.004   
(0.003)
0.003   
(0.003) 
0.003   
(0.003) 
Years of schooling, 
distance ≤ 5 km
a 
0.006   
(0.005)
0.012   
(0.005)
0.000   
(0.006) 
0.004   
(0.005) 
Years of schooling,  
5 < distance ≤ 10 km
b 
-0.003   
(0.003)




-0.007   
(0.003) 
Years of schooling,  
10 < distance ≤ 15 km
c 
0.003   
(0.002)
0.004   
(0.002)
0.003   
(0.002) 








Years of schooling,  
15 < distance ≤ 20 km
d
0.001   
(0.003)
0.002   
(0.003)
0.002   
(0.003) 
0.003   
(0.003) 
Employment at different distances
g  - -  Yes  Yes 
Co-workers education
h  No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies
i  No Yes No Yes 
Number of individuals  112 463 
Notes: Specifications include control variables for the individual’s age-squared, educational at-
tainment, a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is male and an intercept term. Stan-
dard errors robust to clustering at the level of the establishment in parentheses.  
(a-d) See notes a-d to Table 6. 
(e-f) See note b-c to Table 7.  
(g) See notes e-h to Table 6.  
(h-i) See notes i-j to Table 4. IFAU – External effects of education on earnings   34
6. Conclusions 
This paper provided an empirical investigation of externalities from education 
in Sweden in an earnings equation framework. It used matched employee-
establishment data to deal with the issue of imperfect substitutability between 
workers with different educational attainment. It also investigated the idea that 
educational externalities arise through some form of face-to-face interaction 
between individuals. Furthermore, a set of different specifications and fixed ef-
fects models was used to test the robustness of the basic cross-sectional model. 
Two different geographical units of observation were also used: Swedish mu-
nicipalities with administratively determined borders and a set of circles with 
different radii around establishments with information on geographical lati-
tudes and longitudes. 
The basic cross-sectional models suggested that externalities are positive 
and significantly different from zero. The cross-sectional results were also, in 
general, coherent with the idea that externalities are declining in the Euclidean 
distance and that externalities might cross administratively determined borders. 
This might suggest the relevance of transport costs for the transmission of hu-
man capital externalities. All of these results were, however, rather sensitive to 
the inclusion of variables that intended to control for the effect of imperfect 
substitutability between workers with different educational attainment in the 
analysis, industry dummies and measures of the geographical unit’s so-called 
market potential.  
Furthermore, few of the cross-sectional results survive the inclusion of indi-
vidual fixed effects and county dummy variables in the estimation equation. In 
other words, the cross-sectional results may to a large extent be due to unob-
served individual characteristics and unobserved spatial heterogeneity. Thus, 
even though some geographical areas have relatively high average educational 
attainment, this does not necessarily cause higher earnings in these areas.  
One qualification of this conclusion seems warranted, however. The models 
used here do not include an explicit dynamic adjustment process of wages to 
changes in the average educational attainment in the geographical unit of ob-
servation. Using a dynamic framework for estimating the external effects of 
education on wages or earnings might be a fruitful area for future research.  IFAU – External effects of education on earnings  35 
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